Some of the things that adults learn about language, and about the world, are very specific, whereas others are more abstract or rulelike. This article reviews evidence showing that infants, too, can very rapidly acquire both specific and abstract information, and considers the mechanisms that infants might use in doing so.
ample, we know the specific fact that horses that mate with donkeys give birth to mules, but also the more general fact that when an animal of a certain species has babies, the babies will ordinarily be of the same species. If you had never before heard of a gerenuk (a giraffenecked gazelle that lives in Africa), you would automatically assume (correctly) that gerenuks give birth to baby gerenuks. (This is no tautology-one can easily imagine a world in which cats give birth to dogs, gerenuks give birth to wildebeests, and fennec foxes give birth to dandelions.)
Both of these kinds of knowledge-facts about particular items and abstractions that hold more broadly-are in some sense statistically reliable reflections of the world, but the abilities to learn and represent these kinds of knowledge appear to rely on different mechanisms, one of which pertains to relations between specific elements, the other of which pertains to what one might call "algebraic rules"-relationships between variables, or open-ended schemas in which we can freely substitute any instance.
HUMAN INFANTS

Relations Between Specific Elements
Human infants appear to be able to represent and acquire both kinds of knowledge. For example, in a set of experiments that may have implications for language learning, Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996) found that 8-month-old infants demonstrated a sensitivity to statistical information inherent in sequences of speech sounds produced in an artificial language. In the first phase of these experiments, infants were exposed to a 2-min-long, unbroken string of syllables, such as tibudopabikudaropigolatupabikutibudogolatudaropidaropitibudopabikugolatu. In this habituation phase, some sounds were always followed by other sounds (e.g., every occurrence of pa was followed by biku), whereas other sounds were only sometimes followed by a particular sound (e.g., one third of the times the sound pi occurred, it was followed by gola; other times pi was followed by daro or tibu). In the second phase of the experiments, Saffran et al. measured how long infants attended to flashing lights that were in front of (hidden) speakers that played test words such as pigola and pabiku. They found that infants attended longer during presentations of test words like pigola than during presentations of test words like pabiku, showing that during the habituation phase, infants extracted information about how often particular items followed one another.
Relations Between Variables
Experiments from my lab show that 7-month-old infants can freely generalize simple, abstract language-like rules that they learn in the course of a 2-min habituation (Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, & Vishton, 1999) . For instance, one set of infants was habituated for 2 min on an ABA grammar with sentences like ga ti ga and li na li. Another group of infants was habituated to an ABB grammar with sentences like ga ti ti and li na na.
After the 2-min habituation, both sets of infants were exposed to test sentences, such as wo fe fe and wo fe wo, that were made up entirely of novel words. For each set of infants, half of the test sentences would have been consistent with the grammar that they had been exposed to in the habituation and half would not. For example, for infants exposed to the ABA grammar in the habituation, wo fe wo would have been consistent and wo fe fe would have been inconsistent. The prediction was that if infants could abstract the grammar of the sentences to which they were exposed in the habituation, they would attend longer during presentations of inconsistent than consistent sentences. Indeed, as predicted, infants looked longer at the inconsistent items, suggesting that the ability to freely generalize originates even without explicit instruction, long before children are fluent language users. (Similar results with 12-month-old children were reported by Gomez & Gerken, 1999.) An additional experiment showed that infants were not relying simply on the presence or absence of immediately reduplicated items: Infants could also distinguish between an AAB grammar (la la ti) and an ABB grammar (la ti ti). (In principle, infants could have made such a distinction based purely on the last two words of a given sentence, but pilot data show that infants are capable of distinguishing AAB and BAB grammars, which do not differ in the final two words; see Marcus, 1999a.) Although these experiments rule out any system that would rely solely on relations between specific words, our initial experiments did not rule out the possibility that infants might rely purely on relations between specific phonetic features. For example, infants trained in our original ABA experiment could have noted the very specific fact that every habituation sentence that contained a syllable that started with a voiced consonant that was followed by a syllable that started with an unvoiced consonant ended with a syllable that started with a voiced consonant. (A voiced consonant is one that is uttered with vibration of the vocal cords. For example, the consonants m, b, and z, are voiced, but s is not.) Given this fact, an infant who heard a voiced-unvoicedunvoiced test item would be "surprised," and hence might look longer, even if he or she had not abstracted a rule. To make sure that infants were not succeeding in our experiments on the basis of learning such specific facts, we conducted two additional experiments in which the habituation items did not provide crucial phonetic information that would be needed to distinguish the consistent and inconsistent test items purely on the basis of memorized facts about strings of phonetic features. For example, the test words varied in whether consonants were voiced, whereas all consonants in the habituation words were voiced, so the habituation items provided no direct information about the relation between voiced and unvoiced consonants. Even with these better-controlled stimuli, the infants still looked longer at the lights during inconsistent than during consistent test items, which suggests that the infants had indeed acquired open-ended schemas and were not using relations between specific elements to discriminate consistent and inconsistent test items.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
What kind of a brain must an infant have in order to succeed in our task? One way to make progress in answering this question is to ask how one might build a computer simulation (or computational model) of what the infant is doing. Researchers who have attempted to build computational models of our results have taken two main approaches, both of which depend in some way on representing algebra-like variables and using operations that manipulate the contents of those variables.
One approach assumes that the child is trying to predict what will happen next in a given sentence. For example, if the habituation grammar is of the ABA type, a child who predicts that the sentence fragment wo fe will be continued by wo will not be surprised if the sentence fragment continues with wo, but will be surprised if it continues with fe. In several models that adopt this sort of approach (e.g., Negishi, 1999; Shastri, 1999; Shultz, 1999) , the model succeeds by treating each position in the sentence as a separate variable. Predictions about what will happen next in the sentence can then be made by simply copying the contents of one variable into another. For example, one can arrange the system so that whatever word is stored in the variable FIRST WORD is automatically copied into the variable THIRD WORD; a system that does this will be "unsurprised" by wo fe wo, but it will be surprised by wo fe fe, because the observed third word (i.e., fe) differs from the prediction about what the third word is likely to be (i.e., wo).
Another approach (e.g., Dominey & Ramus, 2000; Gasser & Colunga, 1999; Kuehne, Gentner, & Forbus, 1999 ) depends on a preprocessor that recodes each input sentence in an abstract way. For example, one could recode la la ta as a set of three true-or-false facts: "item 1 is the same as item 2" is true, "item 1 is the same as item 3" is false, and "item 2 is the same as item 3" is false. Wo wo fe would re-ceive exactly the same recoding (i.e., true, false, false), whereas wo fe wo would receive a different recoding (i.e., false, true, false). In these systems, an infant is assumed to be surprised if the recoding of a test sentence differs from the recoding of a habituation sentence. In this case, algebraic variables play their role within the preprocessor, which must determine the equality relationships for all possible values of the three items.
The first approach to modeling the experimental results (prediction) works like a line of computer code such as "store the value of the variable FIRST WORD into the variable PREDICTED LAST WORD," whereas the second approach (preprocessor) works like a line of computer code such as "output 'true' if the FIRST WORD equals the SECOND WORD." Either way, what is crucial is that the system represents variables (e.g., FIRST WORD) and operations (such as store or equals).
It is not yet known which of these two approaches is right, or if some third approach will prove better.
3 But it seems a safe bet that whichever approach is right, variables and operations over variables will play a crucial role in modeling the experimental results; if so, it will be an important future project to figure out how the human brain could implement variables and operations over those variables.
DISCUSSION
It is too soon to tell exactly how the ability to learn rules is implemented in the human brain, and likewise too soon to tell exactly how the ability to extract quantitative relationships between specific elements is implemented in neurons. Saffran's experiments and ours are only tiny first steps in establishing what kinds of mechanisms infants have available as they confront and try to make sense of the world; these experiments establish the overall character of two distinct learning mechanisms, but do not favor any particular implementation of those mechanisms, and do not indicate when those mechanisms are used. Future work may help researchers better understand the details of how these mechanisms work, how they are implemented in neurons, and how they are used in particular cognitive domains-but it is already clear that infants are active, versatile learners, endowed with more than one sophisticated mechanism for learning about language and the world. Marcus, G.F. (1998 
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